X Technologies / A.I Fund

We finance, build and operate our own applications.

X Technologies A.I Fund is a holding company, not a services firm. We take no client work. Three applications are live, and each is designed so that we, the people who wrote the code, cannot read your data either.

View the portfolio Security model

Primitives in production

Argon2id
XChaCha20-Poly1305
X25519
Ed25519
Double Ratchet
Sealed Sender
BIP-39
DTLS-SRTP
Post-quantum X3DH
Hash ratchet

01Portfolio

Three applications.
One owner.

No client work, no white label, no retainers. We hold the code, the signing keys and the roadmap of every application on this page.

Escalibur

iOS · macOS Shipped

Live

Seals a 24 word BIP-39 seed phrase behind one password. The app never writes the phrase in the clear, only the encrypted envelope. No network, no iCloud, no analytics, no third party in the build.

Argon2id: Memory hard derivation, tuned so offline brute force costs real money
Passphrase only: The envelope opens on any device, with nothing but the password
Indistinguishable: Without the password the envelope is computationally noise

Envelope v1 Binary · versioned · big-endian

Off	Len	Field	Value
0	4	magic	"EXCL"
4	1	version	0x01
5	1	kdf_id	argon2id
6	1	aead_id	xchacha20-poly1305
7	4	argon_mem_kib	uint32
11	4	argon_iters	uint32
16	16	salt	random
32	24	nonce	random
58	N	ciphertext	padded to 128
58+N	16	tag	poly1305

Bytes 0 to 57 are authenticated as associated data, so an attacker cannot downgrade the work factor. The ciphertext is padded to a fixed block, so a 12 word phrase and a 24 word phrase are the same size on disk.

Pingpong

iOS Shipped

Live

A private messenger. Messages, groups and calls. Nothing else. The relay is blind: it forwards envelopes it cannot open, keeps no history, and deletes each message the instant it is delivered.

Signal Protocol: Double Ratchet with post-quantum X3DH
Sealed sender: The server never learns who wrote the message
P2P calls: DTLS-SRTP media, the server only relays signalling

Holy

iOS · Android · Web Shipped

Live

The King James Bible stored on the device, plus messaging that keeps working when the network does not. Black, white, monospace.

31,102 verses: All 66 books offline, hash checked, sealed under your key
Three links: Short range mesh, a local relay and a satellite path
Seven hops: Every handset relays what it hears, packets wait up to a day

02Security

Security is not a
feature we added later.

Each app starts as a written threat model: who the adversary is, what they already hold, and what still has to be true when they hold it. The screens come after.

Ciphertext or nothing

Keys are derived on the device and never leave it. What our servers hold is an envelope, and an envelope is all they can ever hold.

Forward secrecy by default

One key per message, destroyed after use. A device seized tomorrow does not open the traffic from today, and that is not a setting.

No third party in the build

No ad SDK, no analytics SDK, no crash reporter shipping your session somewhere. Dependencies are audited or they are rewritten in house.

Reviewed before it ships

Every cryptographic path is validated against official test vectors and re-derived from scratch in tests, before the application reaches a user.

What our servers can see Pingpong relay · production

Message contentNo
Who sent itNo
Group membershipNo
Profile name and photoNo
AttachmentsNo
Call mediaNo
Your contact listNo
IP logsNo
Which queue to deliver toYes

03Fund

We capitalise the products
we believe in, starting
with our own.

X Technologies A.I Fund is a holding structure, not a services firm. Capital goes into positions we build and operate ourselves, which means the incentive is the product, never the billable hour.

Thesis: Software people can verify. Applications where the trust model is written down and the code matches it.
Structure: Wholly owned positions. We hold the repository, the signing keys and the infrastructure of each app in the portfolio.
Horizon: Long. Nothing here is built to be flipped, and nothing ships on a date that costs it its threat model.

3apps live

31,102verses shipped offline

0third party SDKs

7hop mesh radius

04Method

How an application
reaches a user.

01

Threat model first

Before a single screen exists we write down the adversary: what they hold, what they can run, and what still has to be true when they hold it.
02

Contract, then code

Formats are versioned and specified to the byte. The binary envelope, the wire packet and the storage layout are frozen before implementation starts.
03

Native, not wrapped

SwiftUI on Apple platforms. Interfaces that respect the platform they run on, at the frame rate the platform promised.
04

Operated, not handed over

We run the relays, sign the builds and answer for the incidents. There is no client to hand the responsibility to.

Contact

Building something that
should not trust its own server?

We take a small number of conversations each quarter: capital, distribution, and engineers who work in this field.

Thomaz@xtech.international Read the security model

We finance, build and operate our own applications.

Primitives in production

Three applications.One owner.

Security is not afeature we added later.

Ciphertext or nothing

Forward secrecy by default

No third party in the build

Reviewed before it ships

We capitalise the productswe believe in, startingwith our own.

How an applicationreaches a user.

Threat model first

Contract, then code

Native, not wrapped

Operated, not handed over

Building something thatshould not trust its own server?

Three applications.
One owner.

Security is not a
feature we added later.

We capitalise the products
we believe in, starting
with our own.

How an application
reaches a user.

Building something that
should not trust its own server?